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rates fell from 32.9 percent in 1984
to 23 percent in 1992. The decline
was largest in countries with populations of less than 15 million.
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This paper was first presented at a conference on World Tax
Competition organized by the Office for Tax Policy Research at
Michigan and the Institute for Fiscal Studies in London on May 2425, 2001.

I

n the last four years, there has
been increasing concern by
developed countries about the
potential erosion of the corporate
income tax base by “harmful tax
competition” (in the European
Union since 1997, in the OECD
since 1998). However, the data on
tax competition available to date
present a mixed and somewhat
puzzling picture.
On the one hand, there is
considerable evidence that
effective corporate income tax
rates in many countries have been
declining, and that the worldwide
effective tax rates on multinational
enterprises (MNEs) have been
going down as well. On the other
hand, macroeconomic data from
developed countries do not indicate
a significant decline in corporate
income tax revenues.
This article suggests that part
of the explanation for this phenomenon is that despite the advent of
e-commerce, MNEs find it harder
than some commentators (AviYonah, 1997)” have predicted to
avoid having a permanent
establishment (PE) in market
jurisdictions.
As a result, those
jurisdictions
are able to collect
taxes from the MNEs and keep up
their corporate tax revenues. The
decline in effective corporate tax
rates may therefore be attributable
more to tax competition in jurisdictions where MNEs produce
their goods, which are more likely
Tax Notes International

to be developing countries, whose
revenue data are less available.
If this conjecture is correct, tax
competition may be harming
developing countries more than
developed economies. However,
developed economies may also face
declining revenues from tax
competition if methods are
developed to use e-commerce to
avoid a PE. The article concludes
by exploring the implications of
this hypothesis and what data are
needed to confirm or disconfirm it.

I. The Puzzle: Declining
Effective Tax Rates and
Unchanged Corporate
Tax Revenues
There is a considerable body of
data suggesting that worldwide
effective corporate tax rates are
declining. For example, Altshuler,
Grubert, and Newlon (2001) used
U.S. Treasury data from corporate
tax returns between 1984 and
1992 to calculate average effective
tax rates for manufacturing
affiliates of US. MNEs in about 60
countries. They find that average
effective tax rates in manufacturing fell by more than 15 percent
between 1984 and 1992. Similarly,
Grubert (2001) calculated changes
in effective corporate tax rates in a
sample of 60 countries for the
period from 1984 to 1992, supplemented by published financial
data for the period after 1992. He
found that average effective tax

Chennells and Griffith ( 1997)
calculated effective marginal tax
rates (EMTR) and effective
average tax rates (EATR) for 10
OECD countries for the period
1979-1994 on the basis of the
Fullerton-King
(1984) model. They
also calculated average tax rates
(ATR) based on published financial
data for the same period.
Chennells and Griffith find that
domestic EMTRs declined from an
average of 21.7 percent in 1979 to
20.5 percent in 1994, and that
domestic EATRs (which may be
more relevant to FDI) declined
from 21.7 percent to 17.9 percent
in the same period. ATRs based on
accounting data for six countries
(Australia, France, Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) declined from
40 percent in 1985 to 32.6 percent
in 1994. Note that this last result
is based on firm-level (Compustat)
data and includes foreign affiliates
of MNEs based in these countries.
All the data are consistent with
the hypothesis that tax competition may be eroding the corporate
income tax base. Grubert (2001)
and Chennells and Griffith (1997)
point out that the data do not
indicate any tendency of tax rates
to converge. However, as I have
argued elsewhere (Avi-Yonah,
20001, tax competition may be
driving tax rates down in all
countries as they respond to each
other, so that there need be no
convergence until rates reach zero
percent.
On the other hand, the available
data on revenues from the
corporate income tax in developed
countries do not show any indication of significant erosion in the
same period. Corporate income tax
revenues as a percentage of total
revenues in OECD members were
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8 percent in 1975,1980,1985,
1990,1994, and 1995 (Owens and
Sasseville, 1997). This average
masks considerable variation.
For example, in New Zealand
corporate tax revenues fell from
10.8 percent in 1975-1980 to 8.3
percent in 1986-1992. In the
United States revenues fell from
14.7 percent to 9.8 percent during
the same period (IMF, 1995). But it
can hardly be said that corporate
tax revenues for OECD member
countries are eroding. Thus, it is
hard to see what concerns are
driving the European Union and
the OECD in their anti-taxcompetition crusades.
What can explain the phenomenon of declining effective
corporate tax rates but stable
corporate tax revenues? One
possible explanation is that there
has been a shift within the
corporate tax from taxing MNEs to
taxing purely domestic corporations, since most of the declining
tax rate data reported above comes
from tax returns and financial
disclosures by MINES, while the
revenue data include all corporations. (The EMTR and EATR data
reported by ChennelIs and Griffith
apply to all corporations, but are
based on theoretical models rather
than actual tax returns.)
If that is the case, it would
present an incentive for all corporations to become MNEs, which is
interesting given the current US.
debate on deferral and subpart F
of the Internal Revenue Code
(NFK!, 1999; US. Treasury, 2000).
Given this incentive, one would
have expected by now to see some
decline in the overall revenue
figures. In addition, given the
political clout of small business in
most countries, one would have
expected to hear something had it
experienced a significant increase
in effective tax rates.
An alternative hypothesis is as
follows: MNEs can be taxed in
three types of jurisdictions
under
currently prevailing tax rules. The
first type is their residence jurisdiction, where the parent company
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is incorporated or managed and
controlled. These jurisdictions
typically do not tax their resident
MNEs currently on active foreignsource income. The second type is
jurisdictions in which the MNEs
produce goods, which are to an
increasing extent developing
countries. These jurisdictions,
whether developed or developing,
typically do not tax MNEs either
because they wish to attract real
investment. Finally, the third type
is jurisdictions into which MNEs
sell their goods, typically developed
countries. These jurisdictions
typically want to tax MNEs but

It can hardly be said that
corporate tax revenues
for OECD member
countries are eroding.
Thus, it is hard to see
what concerns are
driving the European
Union and the OECD in
their anti-taxcompetition crusades.

can do so only if the MNE has a
PE within their borders.
I have previously argued that ecommerce makes it relatively easy
for MNEs to avoid having a PE in
market jurisdictions. If so, no
jurisdiction can tax the MNE on a
current basis. But if MNEs are not
able to avoid having a PE, they
will be taxed in the market jurisdiction. If that is the case, the data
above can be explained as follows:
The Altshuler, Grubert, and
Newlon (2001) and Grubert (2001)
data and the Chennells and
Griffith (1997) ATR data all reflect
worldwide operations of MNEs.

These data therefore show
declining effective tax rates due
primarily to tax competition for
manufacturing
activity, and the
lack of residual residence-based
taxation. Recall that the two
studies based on U.S. Treasury
data focused on manufacturing
affiliates, and that Grubert (2001)
found the greatest decline in small
countries. However, MNEs are still
taxed - and may be taxed more
heavily - in countries where they
sell their goods, assuming a PE
exists. These countries are largely
developed countries, so it is not
surprising that their revenue data
show no decline in corporate tax
revenues.
In effect, this hypothesis
suggests that the corporate tax base
has been shifted from exporters to
importers, and that in countries
which have market power and the
ability to tax importers, the result
has been no decline in overall
corporate tax revenues. A similar
phenomenon has been documented
within the United States, where
tax competition has led states to
adjust their formulas for taxing
corporate income from payroll and
assets (production) to sales
(consumption>, thereby taxing
importers more than exporters
(Brunori, 2001).
In the international
context, the
key to this hypothesis is that
MNEs are unsuccessful in
avoiding having a PE in market
jurisdictions. Given the rise of
e-commerce, which on the face of
things enables MNEs to sell into a
jurisdiction
and avoid a PE, why
would this be the case?

II. Can MNEs Avoid
Having a PE by Using
E-Commerce?
The standard literature on
international
taxation of
e-commerce routinely emphasizes
that e-commerce makes it possible
to avoid having a PE. As the U.S.
Treasury noted in its pathbreaking 1996 White Paper, a PE
requires physical presence in a
country and e-commerce can be
conducted without physical
Tax Notes International
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would license existing content to
ServerCo on an arm’s-length basis.
All new content and other intellectual property (IP) would be
developed in the United States,
but ServerCo would own the
foreign rights to the IP pursuant to
a cost-sharing agreement.

Option I
Irish

Server

Co

II. Tax Issues

P

What is the appropriate jurisdiction for Dot.com-International and ServerCo?

l

Dot.com
International
(Holland)

100%

The primary disadvantage of
this structure is that ServerCo
would need to be managed in
its country of residence and
would need to take care that it
does not have a taxable presence, or PE, in the operating
countries. This may be difficult
to achieve. There are also
undesirable VAT implications
of this structure.

l

I

I
conlent

I

Customers

The taxation of the country of
residence of Dot.com-International needs to be considered.

l

presence, that is to say, without a
PE. Commentators have generally
followed suit, some predicting the
demise of source-based taxation
(Horner and Owens, 1996;
Tillinghast,
1996; Owens, 1997;
The Economist, 1997; Avi-Yonah,
1997; Doernberg and Hinnekens,
1998; Kessler, 1999; Cockfield,
1999; Sawyer, 1999; Hardesty,
1999; Chan, 2000; Frieden, 2000;
Cockfield, 2001).
But is this accurate under
current conditions? A recent case
study presented at an American
Bar Association Section of
Taxation meeting suggests that in
practice it may not be so easy for
MNEs to avoid having a PE in
market jurisdictions,
even if they
sell in e-commerce (ABA, 2001).
The case study is as follows:

The International
Roll-Out
of an E-Commerce
Business
Option I - ServerCo
I. Basic Background
Dot.com-U.S. is a Delaware
company that is engaged in
Tax Notes International

e-commerce by providing content
to subscribers over the Internet.
Dot.com-U.S. also provides banner
advertising to third parties and is
paid on a per “click-through” basis.
Under Option I, Dot.com-U.S.
would form a holding company in a
tax-friendly jurisdiction known as
Dot.com-International.
(See
diagram.) That company would be
an international
holding company
that would at some point engage in
an IPO. Dot.com-International
would form ServerCo in a taxfriendly jurisdiction. ServerCo
would be the owner of all foreign
content and would serve that
content to foreign users, subject to
connectivity related limitations.
Dot.com-International
would
form local subsidiaries to act as an
agent for ServerCo. The subsidiaries would enter into content
agreements with local providers
and enter into banner, sponsorship,
e-commerce and other arrangements with local companies as
agent. However, those arrangements would be entered into by
the local Dot.com companies on
behalf of ServerCo. Dot.com-U.S.

l

l

l

l

l

The purpose of this structure is
to migrate profits into a lowtax jurisdiction,
away from the
high tax nets of the Europe
Union and the United States,
where profits would be taxed
at rates near 35 percent.
How does ServerCo gain access
to the U.S. created IP? Is it a
transfer of IP, or a license
agreement between DotcornU.S. and the ServerCo? What’s
the difference?
How does the cost-sharing
agreement work into the
transfer issues?
What are the subpart F consequences of the operation of the
group? Would the US. antideferral rules under subpart F
apply to ServerCo?
Could ServerCo and the
operating companies “checkthe-box” to be treated as transparent for U.S. tax purposes?
Would this allow for free movement of dividends without
subpart F consequences?
17 September
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Option II
Irish

Dot.com

IP License

Co

U.S.

5?
European
Customers

Option II - LicenseCo

content and IP to LicenseCo on an
arm&-length basis.

I. Background
The basic structure of Option II
is similar to Option I. (See
diagram.) It is assumed that
Dot.com-International
would be
formed as a Dutch company that
would establish an Irish IP
LicenseCo, which would own the
content but would license the
content to the individual operating
companies owned by DotcomInternational.
These companies
would act as an agent to generate
content on behalf of LicenseCo and
would then license the content and
other IP from LicenseCo. In
contrast to Option I, the local
operating companies would serve
the content over the Internet to
consumers and practices and
would enter into alliances, sponsorships, etc. for their own account.
As in Option I, Dot.com-International would be treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes while
the other entities would check-thebox to be treated as passthrough
entities. As in Option I, Dot.comU.S. would license any existing
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II. Tax Issues
l

l

l

The primary benefit of this
structure is to allow the operating companies to act for their
own account in their local
jurisdictions.
This avoids the
risk that LicenseCo would
have a PE in the local operating jurisdictions
and is easier
from a VAT standpoint. This
would also provide the flexibility to manage the company
from outside the country of
incorporations.
Does the structure achieve a
deferral of tax in that the local
operating companies would pay
to LicenseCo royalties that
would be deducted against
local taxable income? Would
this create subpart F income?
What role would the check-thebox rules play in the structure?

what is striking about this
example, developed by knowledgeable practitioners, is how difficult
it is to avoid having a PE. The first

option is designed to do so, because
all content is delivered via
ServerCo. However, because
content has to be developed locally,
there needs to be local agents and,
as the case study indicates, this
means that avoiding a PE may be
difficult to achieve. The second
option abandons that attempt altogether. The local companies deliver
the content and are clearly
taxable, preferring to reduce
taxation via royalties. But this
more conservative structure is
subject to transfer pricing review
of the royalty rate, and may not
significantly reduce taxes unless
most of the value is inherent in the
IP.
In general, iflocal agents are
needed to develop content, a PE
may be impossible to avoid - even
when actual revenue comes from
advertising. (In the classic Piedras
Negras case, a radio station that
broadcast in English from Mexico
and derived all its revenues from
advertising was held not to have a
PE, but it developed its own
content). The same result may
occur if local agents are needed for
marketing, distribution,
or
servicing of the goods.
There are some MNEs, like
Intel or Microsoft, whose products
“sell themselves” and do not need a
PE. Intel boasted in full page
advertisements of selling over a
billion U.S. dollars worth of chips
in e-commerce, and all its manufacturing operations outside the
United States benefit from tax
holidays. But for other MNEs the
ability to avoid a PE is less clear
Those MNEs are much more likely
to be taxed in market jurisdictions.
This reality may explain the
relaxed attitude of the OECD
toward modifying the PE concept
in light of e-commerce, which
contrasts sharply with the urgency
characterizing the tax competition
project. On 22 December 2000,
after more than a year of deliberations, the OECD’s Committee on
Fiscal Af&irs adopted a change to
the commentary on article 5 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention, the
PE article. The change clarified
Tax Notes International

Doc 2001-23778 (6 pgs)
TAX ANALYSTS TAX DOCUMENT SERVICE

Special Reports
that in some circumstances, a
server may constitute a PE, while
a Web site by itself does not. The
committee referred to five
technical advisory groups (TAGS)
that were considering whether any
broader changes were needed in
the application of the business
profits article to e-commerce. So
far the TAGS came up with rules
to classify various sources of
income from e-commerce. Of 28
categories of income, the TAGS
classified 25 as business profits
and only 3 as royalties (Schickli,
2001). This means that for most
types of income from e-commerce,
there will be no source-based tax
unless a PE exists, and the TAGS
made no changes in the PE definition itself (For the categories classified as royalties, there is also no
source-based taxation if a treaty
based on the OECD model
applies).
These recommendations fall far
short of what is needed to adjust
the PE concept to the reality of
e-commerce. As the U.S. Treasury
noted in 1996, declaring that a
server constitutes a PE is nonsensical because a server can be
located anywhere. Making a Web
site a PE would have been much
more radical, but would have
eviscerated the PE concept
because even a single sale into a
jurisdiction
via the Web would give
rise to a PE. What is needed, as I
have previously argued (Avi-Yonah
1997), is some de minimis
threshold of sales, rather than the
current focus on physical presence.
But the OECD is in no hurry to
follow this recommendation, which
is understandable
in light of the
difficulties of avoiding a PE illustrated above.

III. Implications
If the hypothesis outlined above
is even partially correct, it carries
interesting implications. For developing countries, it means that tax
competition is a very real and
present danger, eroding their
corporate tax revenues and
resulting in significant windfalls
for MNEs. This is particularly
true
Tax Notes International

given that the corporate income
tax has been a more important
source of revenue in developing
countries than in OECD members,
amounting for 15 percent to 25
percent of total revenues (IMF
1995). Most of these revenues
come from MNEs, since the
domestic corporate tax base is
typically meager.
In developed countries, the
hypothesis means that, for the
time being, tax competition does
not pose an immediate danger of
corporate revenue base erosion.
This may be a temporary phenomenon, given the expected continued
rise in e-commerce, the ingenuity
of tax planners, and the reluctance
of the OECD to change the PE
threshold. In the long run, more
MNEs may follow Intel’s lead. This
may explain the urgency of the
OECD tax competition initiative
(although even that initiative does
not focus on real investment).

IV. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to
advance one explanation for a
seemingly puzzling incongruence
in the available data on tax competition: effective corporate tax rates
on MNEs are going down, but
corporate tax revenues in OECD
member countries are stable. One
explanation may be that OECD
members are successfully shifting
their tax base from exporters to
importers, and that importers are
less able to avoid a PE (and
therefore tax liability) than
previous commentators have
supposed.
If that is the case then tax
competition may, prima facie, be
most harmful to developing
countries that generally export
more goods produced by MNEs
than they import. In the long run,
tax competition may harm
developed countries as well as
MNEs find new ways of avoiding
PEs through e-commerce. And
even in the short run, a shift in the
tax base from exporters to
importers may have negative
welfare implications (Slemrod,
1995).

It should be emphasized that
the hypothesis advanced above is
based on very limited data. To
confirm or refute it, much additional work is needed. In particular, it would be helpful to know
whether the data relied on by
Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon
(2001) and Grubert (2001) show
greater declines in effective tax
rates in developing than in
developed countries.
In addition, data for developing
countries need to be explored to
see whether those jurisdictions
show a decline in revenues from
the corporate income tax. Data
from developed countries are
needed to see whether there has
been a sh.iR in the corporate tax
base from exporters to importers
and what are the revenue trends
from taxpayers engaged in electronic commerce. Hopefully, such
data can become available in the
near future.
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